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 SORTALS, NATURAL KINDS AND RE-IDENTIFICATION*
 NillO COCCHIAKELLA
 Investigations into the logical structure underlying ordinary
 language and our common sense framework have tended to
 support the hypothesis that there are different stages of con-
 ceptual involvement and that while the structures elaborated
 at a later stage are in general not explicitly definable or re-
 ducible to those at the earlier they nevertheless presuppose
 them as conceptually prior bases for their own construction and
 elaboration - even when these conceptually prior structures
 are somehow eliminated or completely reconstructed at the
 later stages. This applies, moreover, not just to the conceptual
 structures underlying our common sense framework but to
 those underlying the development of logic, mathematics and
 the different sciences as well.
 Jean Piaget, for example, as a result of his investigations into
 genetic epistemology has found that our knowledge of logico-
 mathematical structures is obtained through a process of
 «constructive» or «reflective» abstraction which proceeds
 through a hierarchy of successive stages in which the struc-
 tures acquired at a previous stage are reconstructed before they
 are integrated into the new structures elaborated at later stages
 (cp. [10], p. 159). But as Piaget has also shown it is not just in
 logic and mathematics that cognitive activity develops through
 successive stages of progressive structuration! for the develop-
 ment of intelligence and knowledge in general, whether as re-
 presented in our common sense or our scientific framework,
 proceeds in essentially the same way. Indeed, the construction
 of our scientific framework on the basis of our common sense
 framework is itself a prime example not only of how concept-
 ual structures acquired at a previous stage are completely
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 reconstructed before they are integrated into those elaborated
 at the later stage but also of how the later structures though
 built upon the earlier cannot be reduced to or defined in terms
 of them (cf. Seilars [11]).
 Now there are different ways in which we might investigate
 and represent these successive stages of progressive structura-
 tion in our conceptual frameworks. E.g., because of his «fun-
 damental hypothesis» that «there is a parallelism between the
 progress made in the logical and rational organization of know-
 ledge and the corresponding formative psychological proces-
 ses» ([9], p. 13), Piaget's approach has been a general inquiry
 into our formative psychological processes. The first principle
 of genetic epistemology, according to Piaget, is «to take psy-
 chology seriously» (ibid., p. 9).
 There is an alternative for philosophical logicians, however.
 For while it is not within our expertise to inquire into our
 formative psychological processes, we can nevertheless contri-
 bute to the study and representation of «the logical and
 rational organization of knowledge» through the construction
 of theories of logical form that are characteristic of at least
 some of the more important stages in the development of our
 common sense and scientific frameworks. One thing in partic-
 ular which the construction of such a theory would help
 explain is the sense in which the operations and co-ordinations
 of concepts that characterize a given stage of conceptual in-
 volvement constitute a self-sufficient structured whole which
 purports to have limits beyond which there is nothing for
 thought. And it would also help explain how the formalization
 of these operations and the clarification of their limits can be
 the basis for new and more elaborate operations whose struc-
 turation transcends those same limits and leads to a new
 stage of conceptual involvement.
 It is this methodology that we shall adopt in what follows
 where our primary concern will be the logical structure of
 our referential devices for quantifying, identifying and classi-
 fying things. We shall particularly be concerned with how
 this structure is to bear upon the problem of cross-world and
 re-identification.
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 1. Sortal Concepts:
 Despite the differences in their grammatical roles, common
 nouns, adjectives and intransitive verbs are all represented as
 monadic predicates in standard logical theory. That is, they
 are all interpreted as having the same logical form or con-
 ceptual structure.
 There have been some objections to this interpretation, how-
 ever. E.g., P.F. Strawson has associated sortal universais with
 common nouns and characterizing universais with adjectives
 and verbs. A sortal universal, according to Strawson, «sup-
 plies a principle for distinguishing and counting individual par-
 ticulars which it collects. It presupposes no antecedent prin-
 ciple, or method, of individuating the particulars it collects.
 Characterizing universais, on the other hand, whilst they
 supply principles of grouping, even of counting, particulars,
 supply such principles only for particulars already distinguish-
 ed, or distinguishable, in accordance with some antecedent
 principle or method» ([16], p. 168).
 P. Geach, following Aquinas, has made a similar point in
 distinguishing between substantival and adjectival general
 terms ■ where countability is a sufficient condition for a term's
 being substantival ([5], p. 39). And W. Sellars also has insisted
 on the difference in linguistic roles of common nouns and
 adjectives (cf. [13]).
 We shall follow these philosophers and assume the distinc-
 tion in question, particularly as described by Strawson. In-
 stead of sortal universais, however, we shall speak of sortal
 concepts in the sense of socio-genetically developed cognitive
 abilities or capacities to distinguish, count and collect or
 classify things. We should add, however, that the concept of
 a thing in general is not itself a sortal concept, even though
 'thing' is a common noun. This is because we do not distinguish,
 count and classify things simpliciter but only sorts of things;
 and in fact the common noun 'thing' has come to have a use
 only because of the conceptually prior use of count nouns as
 sortal terms (cf. Sellars [13], p. 253f). Thus, not all common
 nouns are sortal terms but only those that are count nouns.
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 Our initial claim then is that the conceptual structures under-
 lying our use of sortal concepts, as opposed to those underly-
 ing our use of adjectives and verbs, has a primary and distinc-
 tive role to play in the logical and rational organization of
 knowledge. Accordingly, given our present methodological
 approach, we are in agreement with the position taken by
 John Wallace that «attempts to reflect in a pattern of canonic-
 al notation the logical role of sortal predicates ought to be
 taken seriously» ([17], p. 11).
 Following Geach, Wallace notes that sortal terms are gram-
 matically substantival; that is, «they admit the definite article,
 the plural ending, the pronouns 'same', 'other', 'another', and
 quantity words: 'all', 'every', 'no', 'some', 'a', 'many', 'most',
 'few', 'one', 'two', 'three', ...» (ibid., p. 10). It is particularly
 with respect to quantity words or quantifiers, according to
 Wallace, that there is a difference between standard predicate
 logic and a theory of logical form respecting the distinctive role
 of sortal terms. «In English, sortal predicates follow on the
 heels of quantifier words to give the subject matter of our
 sentences. Classical quantification theory obliterates this lo-
 gical feature of sortais; the new theory is supposed to respect
 it» {ibid., p. 12).
 Utilizing the letters 'S', T' (with or without numerical sub-
 scrpits) for sortal terms, sortal quantifiers can be symbolized
 as '(VxS)', '(VyT)'. '(3zS)', '(3xT)', etc., where 'x', 'y', 'z' are
 individual variables. E.g., where 'S' represents the sortal term
 'man' and 'F* is a monadic predicate for 'is mortal', the senten-
 ce 'All men are mortal' (or 'Every man is mortal') is to be
 symbolized as: (VxS) F(x).
 Sortal predication is also to be distinguished, according to
 Wallace, from «standard» predication. Notationally, this dis-
 tinction can be made by the convention that «a sortal predic-
 ate stands behind its variable, while a plain predicate's vari-
 able stands behind it» (ibid.). E.g., 'xS' is to be read 'x is a(n)S',
 while 'F(x)' is read 'x is F'. Thus where 'S', 'T' represent the
 sortal terms 'horse' and 'animal', the sentence 'Every horse
 is an animal' is symbolized as: (VxS)xT.
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 2. Absolute vs. Sortal Quantifiers:
 The introduction of sortal quantifiers merely as a form of
 restricted quantification within the framework of standard
 predicate logic may not seem to be particularly illuminating.
 However, to the contrary, the analysis of sortal quantifiers
 from the perspective of standard predicate logic is just one of
 those reconstructions of a prior conceptual structure presup-
 posed in the construction of the standard quantifiers. After all,
 when interpreted model-set-theoretically the standard quanti-
 fiers are themselves relativized to particular domains of dis-
 course which are none other than the extensions of sortal con-
 cepts.
 Of course standard quantifiers might be taken in an abso-
 lute sense instead, i.e., as referring to everything independent-
 ly of any and all relativizations to different domains of dis-
 course. G. Frege, e.g., viewed the quantifiers of his Begriff-
 schrift in this way (cp [19). But then Frege had really presup-
 posed that the notion o(p an object was itself an ultimate sortal
 to which every other (first level) concept was subordinate; and
 this in effect is the same assumption as that 'thing' is a sortal
 term - an assumption we have already rejected.
 But having rejected this assumption does not mean that we
 also reject the idea that we can refer to absolutely everything
 in some derivative sense. For while we do assume that each
 thing is such that reference to it is possible at all only through
 its falling under some sortal concept, we can nevertheless cap-
 ture the full intent of quantifying over absolutely everything
 insofar as 'everything' refers to everything of whatever sort.
 Accordingly, once second order quantifiers regarding positions
 for sortal terms are allowed we can contextually define the
 absolute quantifiers as follows (cp. [15], p. 205):
 (Vx)q> =df (VS) ( VxS)q>
 (3x)<p =df ( 3 S) (3 xS)cp
 We shall in what follows allow for second order quantifiers
 binding sortal terms. We note in this regard, however, that the
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 adequacy of the above definitions requires that we construe
 these quantifiers as referring not just to those sortal concepts
 which we have already constructed and learned to use in our
 common sense and scientific frameworks but to those which we
 can in principle construct and learn to use as well. That is,
 our second order reference to sortal concepts must be under-
 stood to be implicitly counter-factual.
 We should also note that on the basis of the above definitions
 our original guiding assumption that each thing falls under
 some sortal concept is now a trivial conceptual truth since
 '(Vx) (BT)xT' now reduces to '(VS) (VxS) (3F)xT)'. We note
 this here since it might be objected that the original or pre-
 theoretical assumption was not to be understood in this way
 but that it implicitly presupposes an independent development
 of our understanding of absolute quantifiers.
 3. Sortal Identity:
 Perhaps one explanation of the supposed difference in the
 pretheoretical content of this guiding assumption lies in the
 difference between individuation and identification at least
 as regards things belonging to a natural kind, i.e., things whose
 individuation does not depend on our conceptual framework.
 For as cognitive capacities to distinguish, count and collect or
 classify things, sortal concepts are therefore abilities by which
 things are identified. That is, sortal terms provide us with
 identity criteria! and in this regard, our above guiding assump-
 tion is really the claim that each thing is identifiable and can
 be referred to at all only through criteria provided by some
 sortal concept under which it falls. This claim, however, should
 in no way be confused with the different (and false !) claim
 that each thing is individuated in accordance with some (or
 any) sortal concept by means of which it is identified.
 Our rejection of an independent as well as a conceptually
 prior development of our understanding of absolute quantifiers
 is matched by a similar claim regarding absolute identity. E.g.,
 according To Geach, «it makes no sense to judge whether x
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 and y are 'the same', or whether x remains the same', unless
 we add or understand some [substantival] general term» (op.
 cii., p. 39), as in 'the same S'. Absolute identity, in other words,
 is neither conceptually prior to this form of relative identity
 nor an independent logical development.
 Symbolizing 'x is the same S as y' as 'x = y', the natural
 S
 approach to absolute identity parallels that for the absolute
 quantifiers (cp. [15], p. 205):
 (x = y) =df ( 3 S) (x = y)
 Of course, just as the sortal quantifiers can be reconstructed
 as restricted absolute quantifiers, sortal identity can be re-
 constructed as absolute identity conjoined with a sortal pre-
 dication, i.e., 'x is the same S as y' can be reinterpreted as
 'x = y and x is an S'. But, again, to ignore the issue of con-
 ceptual priority and later reconstruction may lead to an invert-
 ed or distorted understanding of the logical and rational orga-
 nization of knowledge. We do indeed have a notion of unres-
 tricted or absolute identity, but it is one which has been con-
 structed from the conceptually prior notion of identity relative
 to a sortal concept, i.e., identity relative to identity criteria
 provided by a sortal concept.
 We should perhaps note in this context that Geach finds ab-
 solute identity even in this derived form unacceptabe since he
 believes it is possible that x is the same S as y but not the
 same T as y (op. cit., p. 157). And of course this means he
 rejects Leibniz' principle of the indiscernibility of identicals not
 only for absolute identity as defined above but for relative
 identity as well.
 David Wiggins, however, has argued against this aspect of
 Geach's approach, claiming that Leibniz' principle «marks off
 what is peculiar to identity and differentiates it in a way in
 which transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity (all shared by
 congruence, consanquinity, etc.) do not» ([18], p. 5). And Leslie
 Stevenson has convincingly argued that while the criteria
 Geach cites in his examples for the possibility that x is the
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 same S but not the same T as y do define equivalence rela-
 tions, they nevertheless fall short of full identity even when
 relativized to a sortal concept (cp. [14]). And in [15] Stevenson
 has constructed a consistent formal theory of sortal quantifi-
 cation for extensional contexts which takes Leibniz' principle
 as an axiom schema for all identities relative to a sortal con-
 cept.
 We shall adopt the Wiggins-Stevenson view in what follows.
 That is, we accept the claim that Leibniz' law is a necessary
 feature of any adequate theory of identity and that therefore
 it is necessary for sortal identity as well. We shall not restrict
 ourselves to extensional contexts, however, as Stevenson does
 in his formal theory; and for this reason the question of the
 intuitive validity or invalidity of certain theses regarding sort-
 al re-identification in non-extensional contexts will be our
 principal concern. Our investigations in this regard, moreover
 will lead us to reject or at least seriously restrict, both of
 Stevenson's two basic assumptions for sortais (which he
 adopts from Wiggins). These are the assumptions (1) that
 every sortal is subordinate to some ultimate sortal and (2)
 that if two sortais intersect then there is a sortal to which
 both are subordinate (cf. [15], p. 187 and [18], p. 33).
 4. Sortal Predication:
 The novelties of logical form introduced so far are sortal
 quantifiers, sortal identity and sortal predication. The latter,
 however, is redundant and therefore eliminable as a primitive
 form of our logical grammar.
 This elimination of sortal predication as a primitive form is
 not a matter of a later reconstruction, moreover, but amounts
 in effect to the identity theory of the copula which was so
 popular with 14th century logicians. The idea is that 'x is an S'
 means 'x = an S', where the latter is to be symbolized as
 '(3yS) (x = y)', or equivalently as '(3y) (x = y)', or finally
 S
 and most explicitly as '(3yS) (x = y)'.
 S
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 xS =df (3yS)(x = y)
 As a formulation of the identity theory of the copula, the
 above definition also brings out the sense in which sortal
 terms or count nouns can be said to be common names. And
 in this regard it might be appropriate to avoid speaking of
 sortal terms as predicates in any sense. For of course we are
 not claiming here that predicates are names or that every
 predication pattern reduces to an identity. That, after all,
 would be to conflate adjectives and verbs, transitive as well
 as intransitive, with common nouns expressing a sortal con-
 cept. And of course, conversely, the interpretation of sortal
 terms as common names is not to be confused with construing
 them as a kind of adjective or verb. Sortal terms, in other
 words, even when occurring in sortal predications, are not to
 be taken as predicates at all.
 5. Sortal Quantification and Modal Logic:
 One of the more difficult and controversial problems in
 contemporary logical semantics is that of trans-world identifi-
 cation, i.e., the problem of identifying the same individual in
 the different possible worlds which our different modal notions
 lead us to consider. Clearly, since sortal concepts provide
 identity criteria, it is appropriate that we approach this pro-
 blem within a framework respecting sortal quantifiers and
 sortal identity.
 We must be cautious, however, in how we deal with the
 notions of a possible world and of a possible object identifiable
 as such in different possible worlds. For these notions occur
 at an advanced and rather involuted stage of reflective abstrac-
 tion far beyond, e.g., our more basic conceptual involvement
 of identifying existing things in space and time. In particular,
 the metaphysical use of the notion of a logically possible
 World and the related modal notions of logical possibility and
 logical necessity should be most suspect of all.
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 This is perhaps especially so in our present context since
 the paradigm framework for these notions is logical atomism
 where there can be no question of an identity criterion for
 what are there taken to be ontologically simple objects. And,
 indeed, even the sense data of Bertrand Russell's epistemolo-
 gica! variant of logical atomism have their own «perfect iden-
 tity» for which the question of an identity criterion cannot
 arise.
 Now we do agree that as a metaphysical framework, logical
 atomism (and probably only logical atomism) can provide a
 coherent account of a logically possible world and thereby of
 logical possibility and necessity. For because it assumes a
 fixed, absolute totality of simple objects (whose possible exist-
 ence is the same as their actual existence) and a fixed, absol-
 ute totality of atomic configurations with these objects as
 constituents, logical atomism determines in a coherent and
 nonarbitrary manner a fixed, absolute totality of possible
 worlds. And by means of such a totality, logical atomism is
 able to provide a semantical account of logical possibility and
 logical necessity as purely formal concepts with no material
 content (cf. [2] and [3]). In other words, in logical atomism all
 de re modalities (regarding logical essences) are reducible to
 de dicto modalities.
 But in the end, and notwithstanding the clarity of sense it
 gives to the logical modalities, logical atomism is too austere
 a framework to make sense of even the most basic concept-
 ual structures with which we operate in our common sense
 and scientific frameworks. The myth of the simple upon which
 it is built yields at best an idealized abstract structure which
 philosophers can thematically employ in logical semantics
 and the theory of logical form. It is an extreme to which the
 philosopher resorts in his search for the meaning of necessity.
 Having plumbed the depths of this extreme elsewhere (cp.
 [2]), we shall move on to a more realistic view where objects
 are not simple nor identity perfect and where what modalities
 there are, as opposed to propositional attitudes, have to do
 with the temporal and causal structure of the world.
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 6. Sortal Quantifiers in Tense Logic:
 It is well-known that one of our earliest and more funda-
 mental stages of conceptual involvement is concerned primar-
 ily with the problem of (re-) identifying things in space and
 time. It is a stage, moreover, where the conceptual structures
 corresponding to sortal quantification over moments, dura-
 tions, or intervals of time have not yet been constructed or
 fully articulated. Indeed, the deeper or more basic structures
 we find our temporal references manifesting at this stage have
 more of a topological than a quantitative or metrical form; and
 in fact these structures are rather appropriately characterized
 by tense operators.
 Accordingly, given our present methodology and the deeply
 embedded role of sortal concepts to provide identity criteria,
 we shall attempt to characterize the stage in question and in
 consequence deal with the problem of re-identification by a
 theory of logical form in which we apply sortal quantifiers
 and sortal identity to tense-logical contexts. We shall utilize
 for this purpose the sense operators 'P' for 'it was the case
 that', 'F for 'it will be the case that' and 'N' for 'it is now the
 case that'. The now-operator, as Hans Kamp has shown (cf.
 [7]), is not reducible to the simple present tense (which we
 assume incorporated in each atomic formula).
 We understand temporal possibility and necessity at the
 stage in question in the Aristotelian manner, i.e., as what
 either was, is, or will be the case and as what always was, is,
 and always will be the case:
 ONp -&t P<p V <p V F< j>
 □Np ~df ~P~(p&(p&~jF~<p
 We might note, incidentally, that the construction of the
 later stages where sortais for events and moments, durations
 or intervals of time are first articulated is based initially on
 the emergence through reflective abstraction of certain logico-
 grammatical operations for nominalizing propositional forms.
 Events are then first taken as the «things» corresponding to
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 true propositions so nominalized, and temporal predicates such
 as that for the earlier-than relation (of local time) are intro-
 duced corresponding to different combinations of the tense
 operators occurring in such nominalizations. Of course, after
 a series of constructive abstractions leading to the later stages
 where sortais for events and moments are fully articulated
 the conceptual structures represented by these nominalizing
 operations become completely reconstructed and are either
 eliminated or absorbed into the constructed logic of events and
 the similarly constructed geometric logic of the space-time
 manifold (cf. Seilars [12]).
 Accordingly, while it is our view that there is no stage of
 conceptual involvement at which things are identified inde-
 pendently of a temporal framework, it is also our view that
 our (re-) identification of things in space and time does not
 ordinarily presuppose the prior or simultaneous identification
 of a moment or interval of time. Indeed, the general sort of
 tense-logical structure we are constructing as a theory of
 logical form for the stage in question represents just such a
 temporal framework within which such prior or simultaneous
 identifications are not presupposed. The fact that a logical re-
 construction of the semantics for this framework may involve
 such presuppositions from its own later and derivative perspec-
 tive, particularly if it is one based on the logic of events and
 the space-time manifold, should not be taken as imposing these
 presuppositions on the framework itself. For to do so would
 be to invert and distort the logical and rational organization of
 knowledge.
 In turning then to the use of sortal quantifiers in the sort of
 tense logic we have in mind for the stage in question let us
 first consider the problem of referring directly to past or future
 things. The question is whether such reference is basic to the
 stage of conceptual involvement with which we are here con-
 cerned or whether it can be constructed on the basis of sortal
 quantifiers that refer directly only to things "that exist at the
 time in question.
 Elsewhere (in [1]), I myself had argued that an adequate ten-
 se logical analysis of certain English sentences requires the
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 use of quantifiers referring directly to past or future persons.
 E.g., where 'S' is a sortal term for 'person', the respective con-
 tents of:
 (1) There did exist someone who is an ancestor of
 everyone now existing.
 (2) There will exist someone who will have every-
 one now existing as an ancestor.
 are not correctly represented by:
 (l') P (3xS)(VyS) Ancestor (x, y)
 (2') F (3xS)(VyS) Ancestor (y, x)
 where the existential quantifiers refer not directly but in-
 directly, i.e., within the scope of a past or future tense operator,
 to a past or future person, respectively. For what (l') and (2')
 represent are the different English sentences:
 (3) There did exist someone who was an ancestor of
 everyone then existing.
 (4) There will exist someone who will have everyone
 then existing as an ancestor.
 On the other hand, if we already have sortal quantifiers that
 refer directly to past or future persons, then the approriate
 tense-logical forms are easily formulable. E.g., where 'Past-'
 and 'Future-' are sortal term modifiers (derived somehow from
 the past and future tense operators) corresponding to attribut-
 ive as opposed to predicate adjectives, we can formulate ap-
 propriate tense-logical counterparts to (1) and (2) as follows:
 (1") (3x Past-S) (VyS) Ancestor (x, y)
 (2") (3x Future-S) (VyS) F Ancestor (y, x)
 where of course 'Past-S' and 'Future-S' are assumed in our pre-
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 sent context to be (complex) sortal terms which provide iden-
 tity criteria for past or future persons who might not exist at
 the time of assertion.
 Now while we may in principle be able to articulate con-
 ditions for identifying past persons who no longer exist and,
 though perhaps more dubious, also future persons who have
 yet to be born, it is clear that to whatever extent such articula-
 tion is possible it must be based upon our identity criteria for
 persons simpliciter, i.e., to be somewhat redundant here, it
 must be based upon our identity criteria for existing persons.
 And of course the same observation applies to things of what-
 ever other sort as well. The question, however, is whether the
 presumed conceptual priority of referring directly only to
 existing things occurs at a coherent stage of conceptual in-
 volvement, i.e., one at which the conceptual operations in-
 volved constitute a self-sufficient structured whole, or whether
 the purported difficulty of representing sentences like (1) - (2)
 indicates a structural flaw which must be emended, e.g., by
 constructing sortais which provide identity criteria for past
 or future things, before such structured self-sufficiency or
 wholeness can be achieved.
 My own view in [1], as already noted, was that something
 like sortais for past or future things were necessary for the
 representation of sentences like (1) - (2). However, the tense-
 logical contexts considered at that time did not include the
 now - operator which I had then assumed to be reducible to the
 simple present tense (which was taken as being incorporated
 in each atomic formula). Once Hans Kamp had clearly dis-
 tinguished the logic of this operator and showed it not to be
 reducible to the simple present tense (in quantificational con-
 texts), we discover that (1) - (2) can be formulated without
 resorting to sortal quantifiers that refer directly to past or
 future persons after all:
 (1*) P (3xS) N (VyS) Ancestor (x, y)
 (2*) F (3xS) N (VyS) F Ancestor (y, x)
 Generalizing upon this last result we see that we can context-
 SORTALS, NATURAL KINDS AND RE-IDENTIFICATION 453
 ually define the quantificational use of such sortais as 'Past-S"
 and "Future-S' as follows ('):
 ( V X Past-S) (p =df ~ P ~ ( V xS) N tp
 (Vx Future-S) <p =df ~F ~ (VxS) N q>
 We shall assume accordingly that a tense logic such as we
 are now contemplating where sortal quantifiers refer directly
 only to existing things corresponds to a coherent stage of
 conceptual involvement, i.e., one whose conceptual operations
 constitute a self-sufficient structured whole. It is assumed to
 constitute, moreover, the conceptually prior basis upon which
 the conceptual structures requisite for direct quantification
 over realia, i.e., things that exist at some time or other, are to
 be constructed.
 We shall also assume that singular terms (including free in-
 dividual variables) in the theory of logical form characterizing
 this stage need not refer at any given time to a thing existing
 at that time. That is, at this stage to be is not to be the (pur-
 ported) value of a variable. Instead, to be is to be identifiable
 by means of some sortal concept:
 E!(x) =df (3S)(3yS)(x = y)
 Naturally, this formulation of the existence predicate must be
 completely reconstructed once sortal concepts which provide
 identity criteria for realia in general - and perhaps even for
 physical possibilia - become fully articulated.
 7. Re-Identification
 Since sortal concepts at the stage in question provide ident-
 ity criteria only for things that exist whenever they are
 (') Even aside from being sortal relative, our treatment of quantifiers
 here differs from Kamp's in [7]. Kamp's quantifiers, like those in [1], refer
 directly not only to realia, i.e., past, present and future things, but possi-
 bilia as well.
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 identifiable by means of such concepts, the problem of re-
 identification is at this stage the problem of identifying the
 same thing at different times at which it exists. Actually, how-
 ever, in our present context it is even more narrow a problem
 than that; for the problem and any thesis proposed as its
 solution must be formulable within the type of tense logical
 frame-work which we are concerned with here.
 In this regard, we must remember that any direct quantifi-
 cational reference to things in general (in the sense of the
 absolute quantifier defined earlier) can only be to things iden-
 tifiable (and therefore existing) at the time of assertion. More-
 over, since we cannot station ourselves in time outside of the
 present any more than we can station ourselves outside of the
 world, we take the present, i.e., now, to be the time of asser-
 tion when stating theses.
 Our problem then, more narrowly confined, concerns the
 conditions under which things to which we can now refer can
 be re-identified at any other time at which they exist. And
 having stated the problem in this way we discover immediat-
 ely at least a minimal thesis which we find intuitively valid:
 for there can be no question of being able to re-identify some-
 thing to which we can now refer as being the same thing at
 another time at which it exists except by means of some sortal
 concept under which it falls then as well as now.
 Thus, e.g., the boy you saw then is the man you see now:
 it is the same person. Or, the ring John gave Mary is the pen-
 dant Mary is now giving George: it is the same bit of gold.
 Here of course it is clear that while 'boy', 'man', 'ring' and
 'pendant' are each sortais in their own right, the (re-) identifi-
 cations in question are not based on identity criteria provided
 by these sortais but by those provided by 'person' and 'bit of
 gold'.
 These examples might be misleading, however, insofar as
 the sortais by which the re-identifications are made are such
 that the things in question, i.e., a person and a bit of gold, are
 identifiable under these sortais at all times at which they
 exist. Our minimal thesis does not require this strong a condi-
 tion but only that each thing to which we can now refer is
 SORTALS, NATURAL KINDS AND RE-IDENTIFICATION 455
 in principle identifiable at any other time at which it exists by
 means of some sortal under which it is now identifiable as
 well:
 (A) (Vx) [E ! (x) (3 S) (xS & N xS)]
 The occurrence of the now-operator within the scope of the
 other tense operators is essential here in thesis (A). Its elimin-
 ation is possible only by turning to something like the stronger
 thesis that for each thing to which we can now refer there
 is some sortal under which the thing is identifiable not only
 now but at all times at which it exists as well:
 (B) ( Vx) ( 3 S) [xS & □ ' (E ! (x) xS)]
 It is clear of course that while (B) implies (A), they are not
 equivalent theses. (*) That is, (B) is significantly stronger than
 (A), and in consequence we cannot give assent to it here
 without further inquiry into whatever plausibility it might be
 thought to have.
 8. Sortais and Natural Kinds:
 One explanation why (B) has been commonly assumed deriv-
 es from its application to «natural things», i.e., things that be-
 long to a natural kind. For natural kinds are both associated
 with sortais and are essential to the things belonging to them,
 i.e., anything belonging to a natural kind cannot but be of that
 kind throughout the entirety of its existence. Accordingly, if
 everything (of whatever sort) belonged to a natural kind and
 (2) That (A) follows from (B) is an elementary consequence of the follow-
 ing valid schema:
 (xS-> QtNxS)
 We realize that (B) is equivalent to the simpler formulation:
 (Vx)(3S) nt(EI(x)->xS)
 but we prefer the original because of its emphasis on the present.
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 each natural kind can be associated with a sortal concept, then
 (B)'s plausibility would seem to be assured.
 Now we do agree that within our common sense framework
 natural kinds are taken to be natural powers or capacities
 which things have to act, behave, function, etc., in certain spe-
 cific determinate ways: to be in fact the causal basis for the
 natural laws upon which our scientific theories are construct-
 ed. And things belonging to a natural kind, moreover, are in-
 deed taken to be such as to be essentially of that kind through-
 out the entirety of their existence.
 Nevertheless, it is quite inappropriate to assume either that
 everything (of whatever sort) is of a natural kind or that each
 natural kind can be associated with a sortal concept whereby
 things of that kind can be identified. In particular, most arti-
 facts do not belong to a natural kind; for unlike the ring or
 pendant which is a bit of gold, the materials out of which most
 artifacts are made are so mixed and varied as to render the
 artifact as a whole as not being of a natural kind. And of cour-
 se sortais for artifacts are as deeply based within our common
 sense framework as are sortais for such natural kinds, e.g., as
 the different species of animals or plants.
 Moreover, as causal structures with a potential to be realized
 in the appropriate environment, natural kinds may so far out-
 strip our conceptual abilities as to nullify any attempt to
 associate a distinct sortal concept with each natural kind.
 There may, in other words, be more natural kinds in nature
 as physically realizable causal structures than there are pos-
 sible concepts as socio-genetically or psychologically realiza-
 ble cognitive capacities.
 Still, despite its shortcomings, there is an important metho-
 dological connection between thesis (B) and the theory of
 natural kinds. Consider, e.g., the logic of natural kinds devel-
 oped in [4] where natural kinds are projected as the values of
 monadic predicate variables bound by special predicate quan-
 tifiers '3k* and 'Vk'. A fundamental axiom of this logic is:
 (Kl) ( V x) ( V kF) (OcF(x) -► D°[E ! (x) F(x)])
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 which stipulates that an individual can belong to a natural kind
 only if being of that kind is essential to it, i.e., only if it must
 belong to that kind whenever it exists. Here of course we are
 concerned not with any putative logical modalities but with
 some form of physical or causal possibility and necessity in-
 stead. The possible worlds over which these modalities range
 are worlds in which the same laws of nature hold as hold here.
 Such worlds may in particular be none other than the physic-
 ally accessible world-lines of the one cosmic system of world-
 lines to which our world-line (s) belong(s).
 In any case, adapting this logic of natural kinds to our pre-
 sent context ('), we can formulate the condition under which
 a sortal concept can be said to provide identity criteria for
 things belonging to a natural kind as follows
 NK(S) = df ( 3 kF) □ 0 ( V X) [F(x) xS]
 It should perhaps be noted that the above definiens specifies
 a factual and not a logical condition. That is, whether or not
 there is in nature a natural kind the members of which are
 identified by means of a given sortal concept is something to
 be discovered by scientific inquiry and not by purely logical
 or semantical means alone.
 Now by (Kl) and the above definition, anything which can
 be identified by means of a sortal to which there corresponds
 a natural kind is re-identifiable by means of that same sortal
 not only at all times (of our world-line) at which it exists but
 at all times at which it exists in any causally accessible world
 (or world-line) as well. That is, we have the following:
 (*) The (absolute) quantifiers in [4] range over realia and even physical
 possibilia. It is still our view that such quantifiers are necessary for the
 full development of the theory of natural kinds. However, for our present
 purposes we can easily understand the theses of (4) to be restricted to the
 absolute quantifiers of this earlier stage of conceptual involvement.
 (C) NK(S) -» ( VxS) □ • (E ! (x) -> xS)
 as a valid thesis. Of course (C) has as its antecedent the hypo-
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 thesis that there is a natural kind the members of which can
 be identified under the sortal in question and this hypothesis
 may require just the re-identifications involved in the conse-
 quent of (C) for its confirmation; in which case (C), despite its
 validity, can hardly be said to specify a condition under which
 such re-identifications can be made in the first place .
 Nevertheless, conditions that render scientific inquiry in-
 telligible would appear to validate at least as a methodological
 principle the thesis that anything belonging to a natural kind
 can in principle be identified by means of some sortal to
 which there corresponds a natural kind (and to which therefore
 the thing belongs) :
 (MT1) ( V X) [( 3 kF) F(x) ->(3S) (NK(S) & xS)]
 It is not assumed in (MT1) that the natural kind corresponding
 to a sortal by means of which a natural thing can be identified
 need be an infima species. That may in fact be the ideal we
 strive for in scientific research and it too may be methodolo-
 gically warranted. But as regards the justification of thesis (B)
 when applied to natural things, it is an additional assumption
 we do not need to make here in our present context. For by
 (C), which is valid on purely conceptual grounds, and by the
 weaker methodological assumption (MT1), thesis (B), when
 restricted to natural things, follows. That is, we take:
 (B*) ( Vx) [( 3 kF) F(x) -*• ( 3 S) (xS & [E ! (x) -» xS])]
 to be methodologically warranted even if not valid on purely
 conceptual grounds. And of course the same claim can be
 made for thesis (B) in the strictly temporal contexts as well,
 since what is causally necessary is temporally necessary.
 Finally, as regards validity simpliciter, we should note that
 not only do we still have thesis (A) as a valid condition for
 re-identification, but even as a condition for cross-world identi-
 fication in causal contexts the immediacy of (A) 's intuitive
 validity remains. Accordingly, we take the stronger thesis:
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 (Ac) ( Vx) Dc [E ! (x) ( 3 S) (xS & N xS)]
 to be valid in our combined tense-logical framework of sortais
 and natural kinds.
 9. Sortal Proper Names:
 Another explanation regarding thesis (B) derives from the
 use of proper names to uniquely identify (at most) a single
 thing. The novel insight here is that proper names can be
 assimilated with common names so as to constitute a special
 type of sortal term.
 This assimilation is justified in part because of the way in
 which both proper names and common names provide identity
 criteria, even if the former is to a point of uniqueness. E.g.,
 according to Geach «any given successful use of a proper
 name is tied to identification by some definite criterion of
 identity» ([6], p. 295). And Sellars makes a similar point claim-
 ing that where 'S' is a proper name, 'S exists (did exist, will
 exist)' has the sense of 'something satisfies (satisfied, will
 satisfy) the criteria for being called 'S', where the criteria in-
 clude a uniqueness condition ([12]. p. 562).
 Now in regard to this uniqueness condition it should be clear
 that we are not suggesting that proper names are like com-
 mon names in that both can be used to identify or refer to more
 than one thing. For of course proper names can be and are
 so used. But unlike the unambiguous use of a common name
 to identify or refer to many things, a proper name can be so
 used only ambiguously. That is, it is the unambiguous use of
 a proper name that we take to be a cognitive capacity to
 uniquely identify (at most) one thing. And it is only with this
 use that we are here concerned.
 Construing proper names as sortal terms means more than
 that they provide identity criteria, however. In particular, it
 also means that their referential role is primarily quantifica-
 tional. E.g., where 'S' is a (proper name) sortal for 'Pegasus'
 and 'T' is a sortal for 'winged horse', we can now see how on
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 one interpretation 'Pegasus is a winged horse' would be true:
 (VxS)xT
 while on another it would be false:
 ( 3 xS)xT
 Interpreted in the first way it is taken as asserting only that
 whatever is (uniquely) identifiable as Pegasus is a winged
 horse, while in the second it is taken as asserting the existence
 of something (uniquely) identifiable as Pegasus which is a
 winged horse. Thus, the so-called presupposition free use of
 a proper name such as 'Pegasus' is accounted for by the uni-
 versal sortal quantifier '(VxS)', while the existential presup-
 positional use is accounted for by '( 3 xS)'
 Our assimilation explains, moreover, why issues of scope
 are relevant to proper names occurring in epistemic or doxas-
 tic contexts. E.g., where 'S' and 'T' are as above and 'B' is a
 doxastic operator for 'John believes that', we have four ways
 of disambiguating 'John believes that Pegasus is a winged
 horse', each depending first on the question of the scope of
 'Pegasus' as a quantified sortal term and, second, on whether




 B ( 3 xS)xT
 ( 3 xS) BxT
 Assuming then that we have made a reasonable case for the
 assimilation of proper names to sortal terms, let us turn to
 the supposed defense of thesis (B). We note first in this regard
 that proper names are used only ambiguously to identify dif-
 ferent things not only at the same time but at different times
 as well. That is, proper names in the sense intended here are
 «rigid designators» with respect to temporal contexts. And
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 what we take this to mean is that as used now a proper name
 sortal is projected as always ref ering to or identifying one
 and the same thing which in principle is always so identifiable
 whenever it exists. Accordingly, we take
 (VxS) [□* ( VyS) (y = x) & Œ (E I (x) -► xS)]
 to be valid when 'S' is a proper name sortal. Moreover, for
 purposes more of notational convenience we shall assume not
 only that every proper name sortal satisfies the above condi-
 tion but also that any sortal doing so amounts to a propre
 name sortal with respect to temporal contexts:
 PN*(S) =df (VxS) [□' (VyS) (y = x) &
 □l (E ! (x) -> xS)]
 Now the stronger claim that proper names are «rigid desi-
 gnators» in causal as well as temporal contexts has been made,
 e.g., by S. Kripke (cf. [8]). On this view there is somehow a
 causal connection established between a proper name and the
 thing it can be used to uniquely identify so that the name can-
 not be unambiguously used even in causal contexts to identify
 something else. In other words, on this view, which we shall
 also accept here, even
 (VxS) [□• (VyS) (y = x) & (E ! (x) ->xS)]
 is valid when 'S' is a proper name sortal. Accordingly, again
 more for notational convenience, we shall assume not only
 that every proper name sortal satisfies this condition but also
 that any sortal doing so amounts to a proper name sortal with
 respect to causal (as Well as temporal) contexts:
 PN°(S) =df (VxS) [□• (VyS) (y = x) &
 Qc (E ! (x) -► xS)]
 Finally, in regard to the defense of thesis (B) we can distin-
 guish between the weeker claim that everything (of whatever
 462 NINO COCCHIARELLA
 sort) is in principle identifiable by means of a proper name
 sortal with respect to temporal contexts:
 (D) (Vx) (3S) [PNť(S) & xS]
 from which thesis (B) follows, and the stronger similar claim for
 causal contexts:
 (Dc) (Vx) ( 3 S) [PNC(S) & xS]
 It is clear of course that (D) is but a more specialized form
 of (B), as well as that (Dc) is but a more specialized form of:
 (B°) (Vx) ( 3 S) [xS & IIIe (E!(x)->xS)]
 Consequently, our problem regarding whatever plausibility
 (B), and now (Bc) as well, might be thought to have has only
 shifted to the more stringent problem of justifying (D) and
 (Dc).
 Theses (D) and (Dc) might perhaps seem and even be accep-
 table when applied to the things of our common sense frame-
 work, at least so long as we are clear that we are concerned
 here with what is in principle uniquely identifiable by means
 of a proper name sortal. But when applied to the theoretical
 entities of our scientific framework, on the other hand, their
 acceptability is quite another matter. For even if, as seems un-
 likely, we could in principle uniquely identify each atom or
 molecule upon which physical chemistry is based, the pheno-
 mena of quantum physics suggests that principle will have to
 go by the board in the case things in the sub-atomic micro-
 world Indeed, even just fixing our quantificational reference
 to these things in terms of the identity criteria provided by
 theoretical, and therefore general, sortais is still something of a
 problem today and brings us to the very frontiers of our devel-
 oping scientific framework. Consequently, at least as applied
 to the things in the micro-world if not also to the things of
 our common sense framework, we remain dubious of the ac-
 ceptability of (D) and (Dc) as intuitively valid theses.
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 Finally, we should be wary of an attempt to justify (D) and
 (Dc) by reference to so-called individual natures or essences
 which somehow can in principle have proper name sortais
 correlated with them. For even if there are such natures in
 the world we must still distinguish them in their individuating
 function as an aspect of reality from the uniquely identifying
 and referential role of their associated proper names as an
 aspect of our conceptual framework. Moreover, since such
 individual natures or essences are at best attributable only
 to things belonging to a natural kind (including the natural
 kinds in the micro-world), any attempt to defend (D) and (Dc)
 along these lines must be restricted to natural things and
 can at best be proposed as a methodological thesis even more
 demanding than (MT1) restricted to sortais for infima species:
 (MT2) ( Vx) [ 3 kF) F(x) - > ( B S) (NK(S) & PNC(S) & xS)]
 10. Re-Identification through Sor tal Subordination:
 One implicit assumption of the view that individual natures
 or essences are necessary for cross-identification through caus-
 al as well as temporal contexts seems to be that such identifi-
 cation is possible only by a «narrowing» of identity criteria
 to a point of uniqueness corresponding to the real or causal
 individuation of the thing in question. This in a way is the
 same assumption mentioned earlier that somehow there must
 be a perfect match if not second order sameness between the
 real individuation of a thing and its identity (4). And just as we
 rejected this version of the assumption, so too we reject the
 other. For even if there are individual natures or essences, the
 use of a proper name sortal does not presuppose that the ident-
 ity criterion it provides must somehow correspond to the real
 individuation of the thing (if any) to which it refers. Nor of
 (4) Identity and individuation do co-incide when restricted to purely
 logical or conceptual things, however, E.g., the principle of individuation
 for classes is the same as their identity criterion: classes are the same
 iff they have the same members.
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 course does the use of a general sortal under which things
 belonging to a natural kind are identified presuppose that the
 identity criteria provided must somehow match the generic
 individuation of these things. (This may, however, be an ideal
 of science as regards theoretical sortais. But these, because of
 constraints regarding nomological form, will not be proper na-
 me sortais in any case).
 Moreover, even aside from the question of individuation,
 cross-world and re-identification need not in general be based
 on a «narrowing» but might instead be based on a «widening»
 of identity criteria. For by widening our criteria from those
 provided by one sortal to those provided, e.g., by a superor-
 dinate sortal, we are able to cross- and re-identify things which
 because of changed conditions are not identifiable under the
 narrower or subordinate sortal. Thus, e.g.. it is just such widen-
 ing we resort to when we (re-) identify the boy you saw and
 the man you see as the same person.
 Now as a general proposal we can again distinguish between
 a weaker and a stronger version of the claim in question. On
 the weaker version subordination is defined as sempiternal
 inclusion:
 S^T =df □' (VxS)xT
 t
 while on the stronger it is taken as inclusion in all causally
 accessible situations as well:
 S^T =df D0 (VxS)xT
 c
 The weaker and stronger claims then are the theses that
 everything identifiable by means of a sortal S is identifiable
 in principle whenever it exists by means of some sortal to
 which S is temporally or causally subordinate, respectively:
 (E) (VS) ( VxS) □' [E ! (x) - » ( 3 T) (S < T & xT)]
 t
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 (Ec) ( V S) ( VxS) Dc [E ! (x) -* ( 3 T) (S < T & xT)]
 c
 These theses, we might note, imply (A) and (Ac), respect-
 ively, but do not imply (B) and (Bc). And in this latter regard
 we should distinguish (E) and (Ec) from the much stronger
 claims:
 (F) ( VS) ( 3 T) (S ^ T & ( VxS) [E ! (x) xT])
 t
 (Fc) (VS) (3T) (S ^ T& (VxS)Dc [E ! (x^xT])
 c
 which while they imply (B) and (Bc), respectively, are clearly
 to be rejected in as much as they fail when applied to sortais
 for artifacts.
 But then thesis (Ec) fails for essentially the same reason;
 and if '<' in (E) were replaced by '<' where
 t
 S < T =df S^T&~(T^S)
 t t t
 than perhaps even (E) as well would have to be rejected. How-
 ever, since a sortal is temporally subordinate to itself, it is not
 clea  that (E) is to be rejected at all.
 We are not claiming here, on the other hand, that (E) should
 be accepted as intuitively valid. Like (B) it is a thesis which
 oth yields (A) a d which does not require the now-operator
 f r its formulation. But also like (B) it is significantly stronger
 than (A) and not acceptable as intuitively valid without further
 inquiry into the grounds for whatever plausibility it might be
 tho ght to have.
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 11. Ultimate Sortais:
 We should in particular be cautious of the attempt to defend
 (E) in terms of ultimate sortais. For while (E) when restricted
 to sortais for natural kinds is indeed a consequence of a sum-
 mum genus principle for such sortais, (E) itself, i.e., (E) when
 not so restricted, is independent of the more general assump-
 tion that every sortal is subordinate to some ultimate sortal.
 Defining ultimate sortais relative to temporal or causal con-
 texts, respectively, as:
 Ulť(S) =df ~ ( 3 T) (S < T)
 t
 Ultc(S) =df ~ ( 3 T) (S < T)
 c
 we can formulate the weaker and stronger assumptions regard-
 ing ultimate sortais as follows:
 (US') (VS) ( 3 T) [S < T & Ult'(T)]
 t
 (USC) (VS) (3T) [S ^ T & Ultc(T)]
 c
 Our initial claim then is that neither (US') nor (US0) imply
 either (E) or (Ec). or for that matter any other thesis regarding
 conditions for cross-world or re-identification. In particular,
 where S is a sortal for things that do not in general belong
 to a natural kind, the fact that an S is a T, where T is an
 ultimate sortal to which S is (temporally or causally) subor-
 dinate, does not imply that the S question is always a T
 whenever it exists.
 As also indicated, however, there is a connection between
 (E) when restricted to sortais for natural kinds and the parallel
 assumption regarding ultimate sortais for natural kinds. E.g.,
 defining the latter notion as:
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 Ultk(S) =df NK(S) & ~ ( 3 T) [S < T & NK(T)]
 c
 we can formulate a summun genus principle for sortais to the
 effect that every sortal under which things belonging to a
 natural kind can be identified is (causally) subordinate to an
 ultimate sortal for natural kinds:
 (USk) (VS) (NK(S) -» ( 3 T) [S T & Ultk(T)])
 c
 from which follows thesis (Fc) but restricted to sortais for na-
 tural kinds:
 (Fk) ( V S) (NK(S) -> ( 3 1) (S5Í T & ( VS) D® [E ! (x) - ► xT])]
 c
 And from (Fk) of course both (E) and (Ec) follow when restrict-
 ed in the same way, i.e., (Fk) implies
 (Ek) ( V S) (NK(S) -> ( VxS) Dc [E ! (x)
 ( 3 T) (S ^ T & xT])]
 c
 Now while we do not believe that any of the theses (US4),
 (USC) or (USk) can be validated on purely conceptual grounds,
 we do think that (USk), and therefore (Fk) and (Ek) as well,
 might at least be methodologically warranted. E.g., if we as-
 sume as an ideal of science the methodological thesis that for
 each natural kind which is a summum genus there is a sortal
 under which things belonging to that kind are in principle
 identifiable:
 (MT3) ( V kF) [Oc ( 3 x) (F(x) & ( V kG) [G(x) -»• G <¡ F]) -»
 c
 (3 S) D® (Vx) (F(x) <-> xS)]
 then (USk) can be methodologically warranted (at least for non-
 vacuous sortais) on the basis of the ontological thesis that
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 everything belonging to a natural kind belongs to a summum
 genus, i.e., a natural kind which has subordinate to it every
 natural kind to which the thing belongs:
 (K2) ( Vx) [( 3 kF)F(x) -» ( 3 kF) (F(x) & ( VkG) [G(x)
 G<F])]
 c
 The underlying assumption here is that unless there are sum-
 mum genera in nature as posited by (K2) there can be no real
 individuation of natural things. That is, it is assumed to be
 physically or causally impossible that things belonging to na-
 tural kinds should be individuated through an infinitely ascend-
 ing chain of more and more generic causal structures ¡ and,
 accordingly, there must be a most generic natural kind or cau-
 sal structure determining the real individuation of any given
 natural thing.
 This ontological assumption, which together with (MT3)
 yields (USk), does not apply to the purely conceptual theses
 (US4) and (US0). And, indeed, when we consider sortais in
 general, and particularly those not identifying things belonging
 to a natural kind, there seems to be no reason in principle why
 each must be subordinate, whether temporally, causally, or
 even analytically, i.e., by meaning postulate, to some ultimate
 sortal. That there should be ultimate sortais based only on
 temporal and not also causal contexts can at best be sheer
 contingency. And that there should be sortais that are ultimate
 even through causal contexts but which are not analytically
 determined can only be a consequence of causal conditions
 such as (K2), in which case it is not (USC) but (USk) that is
 really at issue after all. Thus either (US') and (US0) are valid
 because purely conceptual considerations lead us to recognize
 that all sortais are subordinate to analytically based ultimate
 sortais or they are not valid at all. And it is our view that i,t
 is the latter which is the case.
 All sortais are of course subordinate to such common noun
 concepts as those for 'thing', 'object' or 'individual' (in the
 logical sense). These common nouns, however, are not sortal
 SORTALS, NATURAL KINDS AND RE-IDENTIFICATION 469
 terms but rather presuppose or are defined (impredicatively)
 in terms of sortais. Even 'natural thing' is not a sortal term in
 this regard, being (impredicatively) defined as 'thing belong-
 ing to a natural kind'. And then even 'artifact' is not a sortal
 term to which all sortais for different kinds of artifacts are
 subordinate, as has become clear from the contemporary pro-
 blem of providing identity criteria for artifacts on space probe
 missions to alien planets.
 Restricted to sortais then it is not clear what purely concept-
 ual considerations would lead us to claim that either (USť) or
 (USC) should be valid. There are after all an indefinite number
 of ways that we might add to, alter, and even generalize what-
 ever identity criteria we presently possess so that ever new
 and more general sortais might in principle be formulated and
 become an articulated part of our conceptual framework. And
 if this is really so then the structure of sortais» particularly
 those for artifacts and things whose identity depends on «in-
 dividuating standards» set by us, is open-ended as far as the
 possibility of the introduction and articulation of more and
 more general sortais is concerned.
 12. A Restricted Intersection thesis for Sortais :
 Having rejected the first of Stevenson's two basic assump-
 tions for sortais, at least as extended to apply to our present
 temporal and/or causal contexts, let us briefly consider his
 second basic assumption. This is the thesis that if two sortais
 intersect then there is a sortal to which both are subordinate:
 (ITC) ( 3 xSi)xS2 V ( 3 xS2)xSi - > ( 3 T) (Si <5 T & S2 ;< T)
 c c
 We avoid also formulating the weaker version (IT1) where
 subordination amounts only to sempiternal inclusion since, as
 with the comparison of (US1) with (USC), we find the idea that
 such an assumption should be valid only with respect to
 temporal and not also causal contexts to be unacceptable. But
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 then we also find no reason why (ITC) should be valid on
 purely conceptual grounds as well. That is, on our view, any
 plausible defense of (ITC) will be based on causal considera-
 tions; and in that case (ITC) will be restricted to sortais for
 natural kinds.
 There is in fact just such a defense that can be given for
 (ITC) so restricted. Indeed, on this defense we can validate
 not only (ITC) restricted to sortais for natural kinds but even
 the stronger thesis that if two such sortais can intersect then
 one is (causally) subordinate to the other:
 (ITk) NK(S) & NK(T) -» [Oc( 3 xS)xT V
 Oc( 3 xT)xS ->S^TVT<C]
 c c
 Now the defense of (ITk) requires no methodological as-
 sumptions and is based directly on the ontological thesis that
 if two natural kinds can intersect then one must be subordin-
 ate to the other:
 (K3) ( V kF) ( V kG) (Oc( 3 x) [F(x) & G(x)] ->
 F ^ G V G < F)
 c c
 The underlying assumption here is that the family of natural
 kinds to which a natural thing belongs is characterized by a
 chain of causal subordination of these kinds one to another
 so that the thing or its real individuation is determined essen-
 tially by a hierarchy of causal structures operating one within
 another in accordance with natural laws. Given (K2), the sum-
 mum genus principle, this hierarchy has an initial or maximal
 causal structure, a master template as it were, within which
 all the others fall as more and more specific template struc-
 tures terminating finally either in an individual nature or an
 infima species.
 This assumption as well as that for (K2) was of course first
 formulated by Aristotle and both have persisted as deeply em-
 bedded posits of our common sense framework. That is, we
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 believe both (K2) and (K3) to be intuitively valid ontological
 theses with respect to our common sense framework. Con-
 sequently, (IT*) can also be taken as intuitively valid and
 (USk), given (MT3), can be taken as valid at least on methodo-
 logical grounds. We do not find, on the other hand, any of
 the more general theses (ITC) and (USC) or (IT) and (US4) to
 be valid at all.
 13. Concluding Remarks:
 We have found then only theses (A) and (Ac) to be intuitiv-
 ely valid on purely conceptual grounds with respect to the
 stage of conceptual involvement in question. Both specify for
 their respective contexts the minimal conditions that can be
 given for cross-world and re-identification.
 Theses stronger than (A) and (Ac) can of course be formulat-
 ed and, in fact, in such a way as to supersede any essential
 use of the now-operator. But these theses we find can be
 validated, first, only when restricted to natural things and.
 second, only on methodological grounds. The first restriction
 involves ontological assumptions regarding the theory of na-
 tural kinds while the second concerns our ability to provide
 identity criteria by which things belonging to a natural kind
 can be identified.
 It is moreover, this same confrontation between ontology in
 the form of a theory of natural kinds and our present referen-
 tial and identifying operations which we have found to be the
 proper field of application for Stevenson's and Wiggin's two
 basic assumptions regarding sortais. And from our perspective
 and methodological approach what this suggests is that a study
 and formal representation of the nature of this confrontation,
 particularly as regards the logical role of differentia and the
 species-genus relation, is an appropriate next step in clarify-
 ing the stage of conceptual involvement in question as well
 perhaps as certain features of the subsequent stages in the
 development of our common sense and scientific frameworks.
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 APPENDIX
 So as to avoid any question of ambiguity arising in the text,
 we briefly describe a fragment of our intended formal gram-
 mar and a corresponding set theoretic semantics.
 We shall use =, V, ř, P N as primitive logical con-
 stants. We assume denumerably many individual variables,
 sortal term variables and, for each positive integer n, n-place
 predicate variables. Atomic wffs are then either of the form
 of a relative identity a = ß, where a, ß are individual variables
 a
 and a is a sortal term variable, or of the form it (ai- ..., an),
 where at is an n-place predicate variable and cti, ..., ctn are in-
 dividual variables. The wffs are then the members of the
 smallest class containing the atomic wffs and such that ~cp,
 Fqp, Pąs, Nq>, (<p - > aļj) , (Vao)q), (Va)(p, are in the class whenever
 cp, oļj are in the class, a is an individual variable, and a is a
 sortal term variable. (We omit quantifiers for predicate vari-
 ables in our present fragment).
 By a sortal frame we understand a structure (D, I, R, S)
 such that (1) D is a domain of discourse, empty or otherwise,
 (2) Rçlxl, (3) S ç (S©)1, and for i. j e I, U s¡ fì U
 seS sēS
 Sj ç U (s¡ D Sj).
 ses
 By an assignment (of values to variables) in a sortal frame
 (D, I, R, S) we understand a function A with the set of vari-
 ables (of all types) as domain and such that (1) A(a) e D, for
 each individual variable a, (2) A (a) e S, for each sortal term
 variable a, and (3) for each positive integer n and n-place pre-
 dicate variable it, A(ji) e (SD")1.
 We understand a sortal model to be a triple 21 = ( (D, I, R, S),
 A, t0), where (1) (D, I, R, S) is a sortal frame. (2) A is an as-
 signment in (D, I, R, S), and (3) t0 e I. (We take t0 to be the
 present moment, i.e., now).
 Where 21 is a sortal model such as above, i e I and cp is a
 arbitrary wff we recursively define the truth-value oí <p in 21
 at i when part of an utterance at t0, in symbols Val (cp, 21, i),
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 as follows: (1) Val (a = ß, 21, i) = 1 iff A(a) = A(ß) and
 0
 A (a) e A(a)i (2) Val (it(ai
 e A(ji)i; (3) Val (~ cp, 21, i) = 1 iff Val (cp, 21, i) = 0; (4) Val
 (cp iļ>) , 21, i) = 1 iff Val (cp, 21, i) = 0 or Val (tp, 21, i) = 1;
 (5) Val (Pcp, 21, i) = 1 iff for some j e I, jRi and Val (cp, 21, j) =
 1 ; (6) Val (>Fcp, 21, i) = 1 iff for some jel, iRj and Val
 (cp, 21, j) = 1¡ (7) Val (Ncp, 21, i) = 1 iff Val (cp, 21, t0) = 1¡ (8) Val
 ( V ao) cp, 21, i) = 1 iff for all x e A(a)¡, Val (cp, 2l(x/a), i) = 1;
 (9) Val (( V o)cp, 21, i) = 1 iff for all s e S, Val (cp, 21 (s/a), i) = 1.
 Finally, a wff cp is said to be valid iff cp is true at the now-
 moment of any sortal model, i.e., iff for all sortal models
 21 = ( (D, I, R, S), A, to), Val (cp. 21, t„) = 1.
 We note that by clause (3) of the definition of a sortal frame
 every wff which is an instance of thesis (A) is valid. If we
 wish to validate any of the other theses we need only add the
 appropriate clause to the same definition:
 (1) for thesis (B) add: for all x e U U s¡ there is a
 i<=I ssS
 t e S such that for all j e I, if x e U sj, then x e tj.
 seS
 (2) for thesis (D) : for all x e U U s¡ there is a t e S such
 iel ses
 that (a) for ail i e I, t¡ Q {x} and (b) for all j e I, if
 x e U sj .then tj = {x}.
 ses
 (3) for thesis (E): for all s e S, all i, j e I and all x e si,
 if x e U sj then for some t e S, x e tj and for all
 seS
 k e I, Sk Q tk.
 (4) for thesis (US4): for all s e S there is a t e S such that
 (a) for all i e I, s¡ ç t¡ and (b) for all u e S, if for all
 i e I, t¡ ç Ui then t = u.
 (5)j for thesis (IT*): for s, t e S if for some i e I. s¡ fl t¡ is
 not empty, then there is a u e S such that for all j e I,
 sj ç Uj and tj ç Uj.
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